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Introduction 
 
1 We feel honoured to have been invited to contribute to this Festschrift for Ian 
Fletcher. We are delighted to have this opportunity to pay tribute to a man whose 
work in the field of international insolvency law has been so crucial to the 
development of this area of law. Ian Fletcher has been instrumental in the 
development of the theory and practice of international insolvency law, not only 
through his research but also as chair of INSOL International’s Academics Group 
and as one of the founding fathers of and driving forces behind INSOL 
International’s Global Insolvency Practice Course. Both of us have been involved 
in the INSOL Fellowship course. It is a unique programme that brings together 
academics and practitioners from all over the world. It furthers the development 
and exchange of knowledge in the field of international insolvency law and fosters 
friendships. On Ian Fletcher’s instigation fellows and academics have also given 
joint presentations at the conferences of the Academics Group. This contribution is 
based on a presentation that we gave at one of those joint sessions on the use of 
English law schemes of arrangement to restructure debts of non-UK companies. 
 
2 Over the last couple of years an increasing number of non-UK companies have 
sought the assistance of English law, in particular the scheme of arrangement under 
Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006, and the English courts to restructure their debts 
in order to avoid the opening of insolvency proceedings in their “home” 
jurisdiction. This development illustrates the increasing need in practice for debt 
restructuring mechanisms that do not involve the opening of insolvency 
proceedings proper but nevertheless enable a restructuring of indebtedness based 
upon a majority vote of the creditors concerned with a cram down of the dissenting 
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minority. The success of the scheme of arrangement under English law has 
prompted a number of European jurisdictions to introduce similar restructuring 
tools.
1
 Also in the Netherlands a pre-draft of a bill was released in the fall of 2014 
that seeks to introduce into Dutch law a pre-insolvency restructuring tool that is 
based on the English law scheme of arrangement and the US Chapter 11 
reorganisation plan.
2
 This development has also been picked up by the European 
Commission, which in its Recommendation on a new approach to business failure 
and insolvency of 12 March 2014
3
 has called upon the Member States to introduce 
such pre-insolvency restructuring mechanisms in order to ensure that debtors have 
access to a framework which allows them to restructure their business at an early 
stage with the objective of preventing insolvency. 
 
3 The use of a scheme of arrangement in respect of non-UK debtors raises 
intriguing questions of jurisdiction and recognition. The scheme can, of course, 
only produce the desired effect if it is effective in those member states where the 
debtor company has assets. In the judgments sanctioning the schemes the English 
judges seriously examine and give account of the ground on which they assume 
jurisdiction. As English courts want to make sure that they only sanction schemes 
that will be effective, the courts also address the question whether the scheme will 
be recognised in other relevant jurisdictions. In doing so, they rely on expert advice 
from the relevant member states. In most cases the advice (apparently) is that a 
scheme will be recognised, albeit that the underlying reasoning may differ. In some 
cases it is argued that recognition is a procedural matter with a focus on the 
recognition of the judgment of the court sanctioning the scheme that is governed by 
Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(“Brussels I Regulation”), in other cases recognition is based on a more contractual 
approach and it is argued that the scheme of arrangement falls within the ambit of 
Council Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (“Rome I Regulation”). 
 
4 In most cases, the question whether a scheme is recognised has not been brought 
before the courts of other member states. At the end of the day, apparently there 
were no dissenting creditors trying to take recourse against the debtor beyond the 
terms of the scheme. Interestingly though, in a case where the issue has been put to 
the highest court in another jurisdiction, recognition has been refused. On 15 
February 2012, the German Bundesgerichtshof denied recognition of the scheme of 
                                                 
 Lucas Kortmann is partner at the Amsterdam based law firm RESOR N.V. and fellow of INSOL 
International. 
 Michael Veder is professor of private law, in particular insolvency law, at the Business & Law 
Research Centre, Faculty of Law, Radboud University, and adviser at RESOR N.V. 
1 For example, Spain and Germany. 
2 Copy available at: <http://www.internetconsultatie.nl/wco2>. 
3 C(2014) 1500 final, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/c_2014_1500_en.pdf>. 
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arrangements in respect of the English insurance company Equitable Life.
4
 
However, it must be said that the Scheme of Arrangement in respect of Equitable 
Life concerned a particular case as it concerned claims under insurance contracts 
(in respect of which specific exclusive jurisdiction clauses apply under the Brussels 
I Regulation) and also purported to affect claims under insurance contracts 
governed by German law. 
 
5 This contribution looks at a number of aspects of the use of the English law 
scheme of arrangement in respect of non-UK companies. It examines the question 
whether the English courts are correct or should perhaps be more reluctant to 
assume jurisdiction to sanction schemes. In particular where the only relevant 
connection with the UK is that the credit facilities to which the scheme is intended 
to apply are governed by English law and contain a choice of forum clause 
identifying the UK courts as the proper forum for disputes arising in relation to the 
facilities, or, as it was the case in Magyar Telecom, the scheme company’s centre of 
main interests was moved to the UK in view of the adoption of the scheme, the 
question arises whether assuming jurisdiction is justified. Furthermore, this 
contribution will briefly look at the recognition of such schemes in other Member 
States of the European Union. 
 
6 This contribution is structured as follows. Chapter 2 contains a description of 
what a Scheme of Arrangement is and how it is put in place under English law. 
Chapter 3 discusses the grounds on which the English courts assume jurisdiction, 
also in the light of the EU regulations that are in place. Chapter 4 deals with the 
recognition of schemes of arrangement in other Member States and is followed by 
some concluding observations. 
 
 
Schemes of Arrangement under the Companies Act 2006 
 
7 A scheme of arrangement is an instrument that is available to companies under 
Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 (“Arrangements and Reconstructions”). 
Pursuant to section 895(1) of the Companies Act 2006, a scheme can be between a 
company and its creditors, or any class of them, or between the company and its 
members, or any class of them. It can be used for a variety of purposes. A scheme 
can, for example, be used to effect a (de)merger, effect a take-over or effect a 
restructuring between a company in financial difficulties and its creditors. A 
scheme may also include a reorganization of the company’s share capital. 
 
8 The advantage of effecting a restructuring through a scheme is that, while 
generally an out-of-court work out requires unanimous consent of the affected 
creditors, once approved by the requisite majority of creditors and the court, the 
scheme binds all those who fall within its terms, including those who object and 
                                                 
4 BGH 15 February 2012, IV ZR 194/09, available at: <www.bundesgerichtshof.de>. 
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those who did not vote. A “cram down” of the minority in a scheme only becomes 
binding on all creditors (including dissenting and non-voting creditors) after the 
scrutiny of the court to ensure that there is no unfairness in the scheme. 
 
9 The schemes sanctioned by the English courts in respect of non-UK companies 
were schemes that were proposed in order to avoid formal insolvency proceedings 
in the member state of the company’s centre of main interests (“COMI”). Schemes 
under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 may, however, also be proposed in the 
context of a formal insolvency proceeding. 
 
10 A scheme of arrangement is put in place in three stages. 
 
11 First, an application must be filed with the court for an order convening the 
necessary meeting(s) of the relevant members or creditors.
5
 The identification of 
the classes in respect of which separate meetings must be held and approval must 
be obtained is crucial. If the class meetings are improperly constituted, the court 
will refuse to sanction the scheme. The “golden thread” in respect of the 
composition of classes has been set forth by Mr Justice Hildyard in the PrimaCom 
judgment of 20 December 2011: 
 
“The essential requirement is that the class should be comprised only of persons whose 
rights in terms of their existing and the rights offered in replacement, in each case as 
against the company, are sufficiently similar to enable them to properly consult and 
identify their true interests together.”6 
 
12 Second, the meeting(s) of the relevant (classes of) creditors or members must be 
convened in which the proposed scheme will be voted on. 
 
13 A majority in number representing 75% in value of the (class of) creditors or 
members, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting must agree 
to the proposed scheme.
7
 Those who do not vote are not taken into account. All 
classes must consent to the scheme; there is no cram down of dissenting classes. 
 
14 Third, once approved by the requisite majorities an application must be filed 
with the court to sanction the scheme. The sanctioning by the court of a scheme is 
not a formality. The court is not bound by the decision of the majority of the 
creditors voting at the meeting(s). The court has “unfettered” 8 discretion whether to 
approve it, although in practice the courts are reluctant to interfere if a proper 
                                                 
5 With respect to the PrimaCom case, see [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch). 
6 Ibid., at paragraph 44. 
7 Section 899(1), Companies Act 2006. 
8 J. Birds (ed), Annotated Companies Legislation (2010, Oxford University Press, Oxford), at 
paragraph 26.899.05. 
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majority has approved the scheme.
9
 In considering whether to sanction a scheme 
the court will take into account: 
 
(a) whether all relevant formalities have been complied with; 
(b) whether the meetings have been properly held and the majority acted bona fide in 
supporting the scheme; and 
(c) whether the scheme is such that an intelligent and honest person, who is a member of the 
class concerned and acting alone in respect of his interest as such a member, might 
reasonably approve it.10 
 
15 A scheme that has been sanctioned by the court is binding on all creditors, 
including dissenting creditors and creditors that did not vote. 
 
 
Jurisdiction to sanction a Scheme in respect of Non-UK Companies 
 
Introduction 
 
16 When the court is requested to sanction the scheme, it must establish that it has 
jurisdiction to sanction the scheme. In particular in an international context, the 
English court will want to ensure that a sanctioned scheme can be effectuated, not 
only in England, but also in other relevant jurisdictions. Therefore, when 
sanctioning a scheme of a non-UK company, courts approach the question on 
jurisdiction both from a domestic English law perspective and from an international 
(European) perspective. 
 
Jurisdiction under English Law 
 
17 Jurisdiction to sanction a scheme is found in section 895(2) of the Companies 
Act 2006 which provides that a scheme can be proposed by “any company liable to 
be wound up under the Insolvency Act 1986”. According to section 221 of the 
Insolvency Act 1986, a so-called “unregistered company” can be wound up under 
that Insolvency Act 1986. Pursuant to section 220 of the Insolvency Act 1986, an 
unregistered company includes any company, with the exception of a company 
registered under the Companies Act 2006 in any part of the United Kingdom. One 
would assume that these provisions would be intended (only) to cover UK 
companies that are not registered in the United Kingdom. However, based on the 
literal wording of the Insolvency Act 1986, any foreign company that is not 
registered in the United Kingdom could be wound up under the Insolvency Act 
1986. Consequently, any such foreign company would also fit the definition of 
                                                 
9 Ibid., at paragraph 26.899.05; B. Hannigan, Company Law (2nd ed) (2009, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford), at paragraph 26-119. For examples of situations where the court might refuse to sanction a 
scheme, see Birds, above note 8, at paragraph 26.899.06. 
10 See Birds, above note 8, at paragraph 26.899.05; Hannigan, above note 9, at paragraphs 26-117 and 
118; Re PrimaCom [2012] EWHC 164 (Ch), at paragraph 4. 
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“liable to be wound up”, as referred to in section 895(2) of the Companies Act 
2006. Although one can question whether the legislator intended such a wide scope 
for the application of these rules, in practice this is why foreign companies were 
able to approach the English courts to sanction a scheme. 
 
18 The English courts have developed conditions as to whether the court should use 
its discretionary power to wind up such a foreign company. Most importantly, it is 
considered that there must be a sufficient connection with England or Wales. The 
conditions required to establish jurisdiction so as to wind-up a foreign company 
were set out in Real Estate Development Co [1991] BCLC 174: 
 
(i) there must be a sufficiently close connection with England and Wales which may, but 
does not have to be, in the form of assets within the jurisdiction; 
(ii) there must be a reasonable possibility of benefit accruing to creditors from the making 
of a winding up order; and 
(iii) one or more persons interested in the distribution of assets must be persons over whom 
the English court can exercise jurisdiction. 
 
19 However, these conditions are not preconditions for the court to accept 
jurisdiction in relation to a scheme of arrangement.
11
 In Re Drax Holdings [2004] 1 
WLR 1049, Collins J held that the exercise of the jurisdiction was a discretionary 
power of the court. 
 
20 In Re Dap Holding NV [2005] EWHC 2092 (Ch), it was held that English courts 
can assume jurisdiction to sanction a scheme of a company whose COMI was 
situated in another member state. In brief, Lewison J reasoned that since elements 
like insolvency and the presence of an establishment within a member state are 
transient and may change, there is nothing preventing an English court to conclude 
that a company is liable to be wound up in the United Kingdom, as long as there is 
sufficient connection with the United Kingdom. 
 
21 Since then, this position to assume jurisdiction where the scheme company did 
neither have its centre of main interests (“COMI”) nor an establishment in the 
United Kingdom, as per Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
insolvency proceedings (the “European Insolvency Regulation”), has been 
reaffirmed by the English courts in a substantial number of cases, such as (more 
recently) Rodenstock, PrimaCom, NEF Telecom and Apcoa Parking.
12
 
Consequently, it is now generally accepted by the English courts that jurisdiction 
can be assumed for schemes in relation to foreign companies with neither COMI 
                                                 
11 See L-C. Ho, “Making and Enforcing International Schemes of Arrangement” (2011) 26(9) Journal 
of International Banking Law and Regulation 434-443. 
12 Rodenstock [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), PrimaCom [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch) (at the convening stage) 
and [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch) (at the sanctioning stage), Re NEF Telecom [2012] EWHC 2944 (Ch), 
Re Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH [2014] EWHC 997 (Ch) and [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch) (two 
schemes were sanctioned relating to Apcoa Parking). 
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nor an establishment in the United Kingdom, provided that there is sufficient 
connection with the English jurisdiction. 
 
22 In many recent cases the sufficient connection was found in the governing law 
and jurisdiction clauses, where the scheme was aimed at a debt restructuring of a 
foreign company, of which the underlying finance documents were governed by 
English law and the English courts having jurisdiction. 
 
23 In Re Rodenstock, Briggs J made a detailed analysis as to why a choice for 
English law and the English courts (under a senior facilities agreement) constitutes 
sufficient connection to assume scheme jurisdiction. Rodenstock was a company 
registered in Germany, but the senior finance documents were governed by English 
law and contained a choice for jurisdiction of the English courts. Briggs J 
acknowledged that it would not be correct to treat the lenders’ choice of English 
jurisdiction for the purposes of resolving disputes in connection with the contract, 
as a deliberate decision to voluntarily subject themselves to the English court’s 
scheme jurisdiction. However, he continued to consider that such choice for 
English law did mean that the rights of the lenders could be affected by any court 
sanctioned scheme (in any country), if such court decision would be recognised 
under English law. Consequently, Briggs J came to the conclusion that the 
connection constituted by the choice of English law and English jurisdiction is on 
its own a sufficient connection for the purposes of assuming scheme jurisdiction in 
relation to the German company. 
 
24 In his judgment, Briggs J added that he considered it relevant that the case at 
hand did not concern a large number of individual (lending) contracts that 
happened to contain English law and jurisdiction clauses, but rather a case where 
the creditors have collectively chosen by a single agreement, to have the 
relationship between the creditors inter se, and between them as a body and the 
company governed by English law and subjected to the jurisdiction of the English 
courts. 
 
25 This reasoning has been frequently quoted and followed in subsequent cases, in 
which - again – the sufficient connection was based on the contractual choice for 
English law and jurisdiction. 
 
26 In Re Rodenstock, Briggs J considered it relevant that more than 50% of the 
scheme creditors were domiciled in England. In Re Primacom the court was 
confronted with a matter in which it was not certain that there were any scheme 
creditors domiciled in the United Kingdom, or at any rate certainly not a majority 
in any of the classes of such creditors. Nonetheless, Hildyard J found that the fact 
that English law was the governing law for all creditor arrangements did provide a 
sufficient connection to the jurisdiction to warrant the exercise by the English court 
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of the scheme jurisdiction.
13
 The fact that it was uncertain that any scheme creditors 
were domiciled in the United Kingdom, did not alter this.
14
 
 
27 A next development in using the contractual jurisdiction clauses as sufficient 
connection can be found in the recent decisions in two schemes relating to Re 
Apcoa Parking [2014] EWHC 1867 (Ch) and [2014] EWHC 3849 (Ch). Seven of 
the nine scheme companies were not incorporated in England and did not have their 
COMI in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the facility agreements originally 
contained German governing law and jurisdiction clauses. Prior to applying for the 
scheme, the governing law and jurisdiction clauses of the facility agreements were 
amended (in accordance with contractually required majority consent from lenders) 
from German law and the jurisdiction of the Frankfurt courts, to English law and 
the jurisdiction of the English courts. This amendment to the facility agreement was 
expressly made to enable schemes of arrangement to be proposed. The English 
court sanctioned this approach. 
 
28 This indicates that English courts are prepared to go a long way in accepting 
contractual jurisdiction clauses as the required sufficient connection to assume 
scheme jurisdiction. 
 
29 Remarkable in the development of English case law is Re Magyar Telecom BV 
[2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch). This case concerned a company, Magyar Telecom B.V., 
incorporated and registered in the Netherlands, being a group holding and finance 
vehicle for a group whose principal business was the operation of 
telecommunication services in Hungary. The liabilities that were to be subjected to 
the scheme were notes governed by New York law and subject to the jurisdiction of 
the New York courts. Thus, on the face of the facts, no connection with the United 
Kingdom existed. However, prior to applying for the scheme, the company moved 
its COMI to the United Kingdom. The company argued that its COMI being in the 
United Kingdom would provide the English court with scheme jurisdiction. The 
court allowed this approach and accepted jurisdiction to sanction the scheme, solely 
on the basis of COMI. 
 
30 In his judgment, Richards J elaborated on the (many) manners in which 
sufficient connection can be achieved. He considered that the presence in England 
of substantial assets belonging to the scheme company could provide the requisite 
connection because it would prevent execution by the relevant creditors against 
those assets, save in accordance with the terms of the scheme. Equally, the presence 
of a sufficient number of creditors in England might also supply the necessary 
connection, as those creditors would be bound to act in accordance with the 
scheme, both within and outside the jurisdiction. According to Richards J, the 
importance of the connection provided in cases where the rights of creditors are 
                                                 
13 Hildyard J in his judgment of 20 December 2011 in PrimaCom [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch). 
14 Judgment of 20 January 2012 [2012] EWHC 164 (Ch). 
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governed by English law lies in the effect which foreign courts may be expected to 
give to an alteration of those rights in accordance with English law. And in the case 
before him, Richards J considered that the significance of moving the COMI to 
England did not lie in the establishment in the abstract of a connection with 
England but, on the basis that any insolvency process for the company would be 
undertaken under English law in England, providing a solid basis and background 
for a scheme under English law which altered contractual rights governed by a 
foreign law. 
 
31 In principle, we agree with the arguments of Richards J set out above and take 
the view that COMI being in England indeed gives a valid argument to accept that 
the English courts have jurisdiction to sanction a scheme. The scheme of 
arrangement is intended to restructure a company’s debts. If jurisdiction to 
restructure debts of an insolvent company is based on COMI, there seems little 
reason not to accept the same argument for solvent restructurings by means of a 
scheme. 
 
32 The above concise outline of the development of English case on schemes over 
foreign companies and in particular the deliberations of Richards J in Re Magyar 
Telecom, show that the English courts have taken a rather chameleonesque 
approach to establish sufficient connection, i.e. to be able to assume scheme 
jurisdiction. In Re Rodenstock, Briggs J acknowledged that it was doubtful that 
creditors who accept that any disputes under that contract would be governed by 
English law and subjected to the English courts, will have also voluntarily, 
deliberately and (we would add) consciously subjected themselves to the English 
courts’ scheme jurisdiction. That seems a valid point, also taking into account that 
the scheme of arrangement is part of the Companies Act 2006 and could also be 
applied to other debts that have no contractual background. 
 
33 It seems that in the view of Briggs J, it is not so much a conscious and voluntary 
choice by the creditor, but rather that a creditor, who accepts that his rights are 
governed by English law, will also have to accept that his rights are “at risk” to be 
altered by any tool that would consequently be recognised by the English courts. It 
seems that in concluding this, Briggs J also took into account that the case at hand 
did not concern individual contracts but one contract binding all scheme creditors 
and that the majority of creditors resided in the United Kingdom. Adding all these 
elements together, he concluded, on a narrow balance, that the court had 
jurisdiction. However, by now, we must conclude that even in cases that seem to 
have considerably less connection at the outset, the (narrow) balance still rules in 
favour of assuming jurisdiction. Even if creditors would consciously and 
deliberately choose not to be exposed to the “risk” of being subjected to an English 
scheme (by dealing with a foreign company, with no assets or creditors in the UK 
and by choosing a different law for their contract), these cases show that the 
creditors’ rights are still liable to be altered by an English scheme. Parties who 
want to use a scheme can choose from a number of options to create a connection 
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with England, even if, at the outset, no connection exists. In particular where 
creditors’ rights are based on contractual arrangements, meaning that parties 
consciously opted for another jurisdiction than England, we find this development 
to be pushing the envelope. 
 
Jurisdiction under European Law: Brussels I, European Insolvency Regulation 
 
34 As mentioned in the introduction above, the English courts have also been 
conscious that the combined effect of the European Insolvency Regulation and the 
Brussels I Regulation has been very substantially to curtail the international 
jurisdiction of the English court to wind up companies. Therefore, the judges in the 
cases described above have considered whether and to what extent the court could 
accept jurisdiction in accordance with the relevant European Regulations, most 
notably Brussels I and the European Insolvency Regulation. 
 
35 The English courts have been consistent in ruling that jurisdiction to sanction a 
scheme is not based on the European Insolvency Regulation. In our view, that is 
correct. The European Insolvency Regulation contains uniform rules on jurisdiction 
in relation to insolvency proceedings. There can be no doubt that a scheme of 
arrangement that is proposed and sanctioned outside the framework of insolvency 
proceedings – in fact, to prevent the opening of insolvency proceedings – falls 
outside the scope of the European Insolvency Regulation.
15
 
 
36 Pursuant to its Article 1(1), the European Insolvency Regulation applies to 
“collective insolvency proceedings, which entail the partial or total divestment of a 
debtor and the appointment of a liquidator.” A scheme of arrangement under Part 
26 of the Companies Act 2006 does not fall within this definition. Furthermore, the 
proceedings to which the European Insolvency Regulation applies are listed 
(exhaustively) in Annex A to the regulation. Schemes of arrangement under the 
Companies Act 2006 are not included in Annex A. 
 
37 If scheme jurisdiction would have fallen within the scope of the European 
Insolvency Regulation, English courts would only be able to accept jurisdiction if 
the scheme applicant has its COMI or, under certain circumstances, an 
establishment in the United Kingdom, pursuant to Article 3. 
 
38 The English courts have been less consistent in their views as to whether the 
court sanction of a scheme would fall within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. 
In fact, the aforementioned chameleonesque approach of the English courts as to 
                                                 
15 Doubts as to the applicability of the European Insolvency Regulation are also expressed by, for 
example, F. Garcimartín, “The Review of the Insolvency Regulation: Hybrid Procedures and other 
Issues” (2011) International Insolvency Law Review 329; Wessels is more firm in his rejection of the 
applicability of the European Insolvency Regulation to schemes of arrangement, see B. Wessels, 
“Scheme of Arrangement: a Viable European Rescue Strategy?” (2010) Ondernemingsrecht 154. 
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assuming jurisdiction can also be seen in the manner in which the English courts 
have dealt with the Brussels I Regulation. For example, in Re DAP Holding NV, 
Lewison J considered the scheme sanction to be expressly excluded from the scope 
of Brussels I Regulation, considering the scheme to be a judicial arrangement as 
excluded from the Regulation pursuant to its Article 1(2)b. In Re Rodenstock, 
Briggs J had difficulties with that conclusion (in relation to solvent companies) to 
wholly exclude schemes based on Article 1(2)b. We agree with Briggs J, given that 
the European Insolvency Regulation and the Brussels I Regulation are intended to 
“dovetail with each other”, so that no lacuna exists between the two. If a court 
sanction of an arrangement or composition does not fall within the scope of the 
European Insolvency Regulation, it should not be excluded from the Brussels I 
Regulation on the basis of Article 1(2)b. Therefore, as Briggs J holds, proceedings 
seeking the court’s sanction of a scheme fall within the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
39 However, in the different judgments, the respective judges came to rather 
different conclusions as to whether the Brussels I Regulation would not narrow the 
English court’s jurisdiction in relation to schemes. 
 
40 In Re Rodenstock, Briggs J considered that Chapter II of the Brussels I 
Regulation allocates jurisdiction by reference to the domicile of the intended 
defendants. None of the exceptions are apt to address the international jurisdiction 
of the courts of Member States in relation to solvent company schemes of 
arrangement. He reasoned that schemes are not aimed at specific defendants, but 
that schemes may nonetheless be adversarial and opposing creditors may submit 
statements and evidence in court as any ordinary defendant. He subsequently 
concluded that he did have jurisdiction either: 
 
(i)  on the basis that there is a lacuna in Chapter 2 of the Brussels I Regulation, such as by 
analogy with Article 4 to enable each Member State to continue to apply its own private 
international law; or 
(ii) because one or more creditors of the company affected by the proposed scheme were 
domiciled in the United Kingdom, treating such person as quasi defendants. Briggs J 
did not effectively choose between the two options (since both lines of reasoning would 
lead to him assuming jurisdiction). 
 
41 In Re Primacom, Hildyard J came to a different analysis, providing four options 
as to why the court would have jurisdiction: 
 
(i) Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation has no application since a scheme does not 
involve defendants; 
(ii) If Article 2 would apply (but no defendants/scheme creditors would be domiciled in the 
United Kingdom), Article 23 allows parties to contractually agree on a forum (meaning 
that the jurisdiction clause in the finance agreements created scheme jurisdiction); 
(iii) Pursuant to Article 24, a court has jurisdiction if a defendant appears (meaning that if 
all scheme creditors have in fact appeared in the English court, the court has 
jurisdiction); 
(iv) If no provisions of the Brussels I Regulation is applicable, the court should apply its 
domestic rules of private international law. 
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42 Since in the matter before him, Hildyard could accept jurisdiction via any of the 
four options, he (like Briggs J) did not choose, although he expressed a preference 
for the first option. In subsequent cases, judges used these options to establish 
jurisdiction, but picking the options that could apply to the facts of the case at hand 
and explicitly leaving unanswered the question whether creditors to a scheme 
should be considered defendants or not. 
 
43 Furthermore, in Re NEF Telecom, Vos J explicitly considers that any party 
signing up to English law and jurisdiction must understand that the provisions of 
Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 may be invoked. This seems different from the 
view of Briggs J in Re Rodenstock who, as we have seen, assumed that a party does 
not necessarily (consciously) understand this. 
 
44 In Re Magyar Telecom, jurisdiction was assumed, either on the basis that 
Chapter II of the Brussels I Regulation does not apply (on the basis that a scheme 
has no defendants) or on the basis that one or more defendants/scheme creditors 
were domiciled in England (creating jurisdiction over all defendants pursuant to 
Article 6 of the Brussels I Regulation). Obviously, since the financing agreements 
in this case were not governed by English law, Richards J could not rely on Article 
23 for jurisdiction and thus had to follow a different line of reasoning than Vos J in 
Re NEF Telecom. 
 
45 When looking at the deliberations of the English courts on this topic, we must 
conclude that the courts are somewhat struggling to come to a final conclusion as to 
how their jurisdiction fits in with the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation. By 
leaving the question unanswered, the courts maintain a large amount of flexibility 
in respect of their reasoning to assume jurisdiction. We have seen the diversity and 
development of arguments and factual circumstances presented to the court when 
requested to sanction a scheme. By leaving unanswered the exact interpretation of 
the Brussels I Regulation, the courts avoid the risk that certain cases would no 
longer fall within the jurisdiction of the English court. 
 
46 The consequence of this approach is that there is a substantial amount of 
uncertainty as to where the boundaries lie with respect to the English courts 
accepting jurisdiction to sanction a scheme. 
 
Conclusion 
 
47 We have seen that the English courts have taken a chameleonesque approach in 
accepting jurisdiction and have consciously left open certain questions as to on 
what basis jurisdiction is assumed. It seems to us that in accepting jurisdiction, in 
each particular case the English courts have consciously looked at the (lack of) 
possibilities for the company to achieve a similar restructuring in its jurisdiction of 
origin. In each new case that did not fall exactly in the scope provided by 
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precedent, the English courts have continued to take a cooperative (and 
commercially probably sensible) approach: if it is in the interest of the company 
and its stakeholders to sanction the scheme (based on the substantive criteria that 
the court looks at when sanctioning a scheme), the English courts are prepared to 
go a long way (sometimes possibly pushing the envelope) to assume jurisdiction. 
 
48 For the (legal) restructuring practice, this approach seems sensible (in particular 
if no similar restructuring tools are available in other jurisdictions). However, from 
a dogmatic perspective, the reasoning of the English courts is somewhat 
inconsistent and inconclusive. In any event, it leaves considerable doubt (for 
creditors) as to whether their rights can be subjected to a scheme of arrangement. 
 
 
Recognition of Schemes of Arrangement in other EU Member States 
 
Introduction 
 
49 When looking at the operation of schemes of arrangement under Part 26 of the 
Companies Act 2006 in respect of non-UK companies – and, in particular, whether 
it will prevent creditors from effectively seeking recourse against the scheme 
company in other EU member states beyond the terms of the scheme – it is 
important to assess whether such schemes will be recognised abroad. 
 
50 In this paragraph we will first of all discuss possibly relevant EU legislation in 
place: (i) the European Insolvency Regulation and the recently adopted 
amendments to the European Insolvency Regulation (“recast”), (ii) the Rome I 
Regulation, and (iii) the Brussels I Regulation. We will also briefly touch upon the 
recognition of schemes of arrangement under rules of Dutch domestic private 
international law. 
 
European Insolvency Regulation 
 
51 As pointed out above, the European Insolvency Regulation contains uniform 
rules on jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition of judgments in relation to 
insolvency proceedings. In our view a scheme of arrangement outside the 
framework of insolvency proceedings falls outside the scope of the European 
Insolvency Regulation. 
 
52 A scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 does not 
fall within the definition of Article 1(1) of the European Insolvency Regulation as 
to what constitutes insolvency proceedings for the purposes of the text. 
Furthermore, the proceedings to which the European Insolvency Regulation applies 
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are listed (exhaustively) in Annex A to the text and schemes are not listed in that 
Annex.
16
 
 
53 In its report on the operation of the European Insolvency Regulation of 12 
December 2012, the European Commission identified a number of pre-insolvency 
proceedings available in the EU Member States, including the English scheme of 
arrangement, which are not covered by the European Insolvency Regulation and 
observed: 
 
“The main problem resulting from the fact that a substantial number of pre-insolvency and 
hybrid proceedings are currently not covered by the Regulation is that their effects are not 
recognised throughout the EU. As a consequence, dissenting creditors may seek to enforce 
their claims against assets of the debtor located in another Member State, which can 
thwart the efforts to rescue the company (so-called “holding-out” problem). Moreover, 
opportunities to rescue companies may be foregone because parties are unwilling to 
engage in the relevant procedures if their cross-border recognition is not ensured. It has 
therefore been recommended to address these problems in the revision of the 
Regulation.”17 
 
54 As we will set out below, we believe that this conclusion of the European 
Commission is not correct, at least not in respect of the English law scheme of 
arrangement, which in our view may be recognised and given effect under the 
Brussels I Regulation. However, following on the observations of the European 
Commission, the proposals to reform the European Insolvency Regulation that were 
presented by the European Commission on 12 December 2012, provided for the 
extension of the scope of the European Insolvency Regulation to pre-insolvency 
proceedings, such as the scheme of arrangement.
18
 
 
55 The possible extension of the scope of the European Insolvency Regulation to 
schemes of arrangement gave rise to considerable and understandable debate. Even 
though schemes of arrangement are (successfully) used as a restructuring tool that 
avoids the opening of insolvency proceedings (and therefore may qualify as pre-
insolvency proceedings within the proposals of the European Commission), it must 
be noted that it would not be right to simply include schemes of arrangement under 
Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 in Annex A of the European Insolvency 
Regulation (if ever the UK government were to consider doing that). Schemes of 
arrangement serve a much wider (corporate) purpose and in many instances are 
used in situations that have nothing to do with insolvency. Furthermore, the effect 
of including schemes of arrangement within the scope of the European Insolvency 
                                                 
16 Cf. Article 2(a), European Insolvency Regulation and preamble, paragraph 9. 
17 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 
on insolvency proceedings, 12 December 2012, COM(2012) 743 final, at 6. 
18 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, 12 December 2012, COM(2012) 744 final, 
in particular at 2, 5 and 6, 15 (proposed recital 9(a)) and 19 (proposed amendment to Article 1). 
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Regulation would not only be that they would benefit from the uniform rules on 
recognition in other Member States but also that the English courts would be bound 
by the uniform rules on jurisdiction embodied in the European Insolvency 
Regulation. Schemes of arrangement would then no longer be possible on the mere 
basis that a contractual relationship to be amended by a scheme is governed by 
English law (and provides for the jurisdiction of the English courts to settle 
disputes arising from it), but English courts would only have jurisdiction over 
scheme companies that have their COMI in the UK. 
 
56 The recast of the European Insolvency Regulation, on which political agreement 
was reached between the Council and the European Parliament on 4 December 
2014,
19
 appears to have effectively dealt with the issue. The definition of the types 
of proceedings that fall within the scope of the European Insolvency Regulation 
(recast) leaves no room for the inclusion of schemes of arrangement in Annex A. 
Pursuant to Article 1(1) of the recast, the European Insolvency Regulation will 
apply to: 
 
“public collective proceedings, including interim proceedings, which are based on a law 
relating to insolvency…”. 
 
57 Schemes of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 are a tool of 
general company law and are not based on a law relating to insolvency. Schemes 
are therefore “out”. The question whether and to what extent schemes are 
recognised and will be given effect in other Member States, that was the driver for 
the European Commission to suggest their inclusion in the European Insolvency 
Regulation, is consequently left open. 
 
Rome I Regulation 
 
58 It has been argued that a scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies 
Act 2006 can have substantive effect pursuant to the Rome I Regulation to the 
extent that it amends a contract that is expressed to be governed by English law.
20
 If 
the contract that is to be affected by a scheme is governed by English law, any 
amendment to or waiver of contractual claims under that contract will also 
generally be subject to English law.
21
 In this approach it is in principle irrelevant as 
to which kind of jurisdiction an English court was exercising, since jurisdiction is 
not one of the relevant criteria in the Rome I Regulation. 
                                                 
19 We understand that the Council is due to formally adopt the recast regulation in March 2015, which 
will then be passed to the European Parliament in April or May 2015 with a view to an approval by the 
plenary, without amendments in second reading. The recast regulation will be effective upon 
publication in the Official Journal, which is expected around May 2015. 
20 Garcimartín, above note 15, at 330-331. We understand that in some of the cases that have come 
before the English courts, local experts have taken the position that a scheme of arrangement will have 
substantive effect in their jurisdiction on this basis. 
21 Cf. Article 12(1)(d), Rome I Regulation. 
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59 The correctness of this approach has not been tested in court (to our 
knowledge). The difficulty we have with this approach is twofold. Firstly, it is not 
clear whether a scheme of arrangement under the Companies Act 2006 can – for 
purposes of private international law and the Rome I Regulation in particular – be 
characterized as an issue of contract law. We do not share the apparent belief 
expressed by Garcimartín that this is a (somewhat peculiar) example of the “various 
ways of extinguishing obligations” referred to in Article 12(1)(d) of the Rome I 
Regulation.
22
 The characterization of schemes of arrangement as a matter of 
contract law, is also not (necessarily) supported by the approach to schemes under 
English law. Hannigan observes that: 
 
“Though binding the members or creditors to the same extent as if they had made a 
contract, a scheme is not a contract, but a statutory procedure subject to court approval.”23 
 
60 Furthermore, if the scheme of arrangement were indeed a matter of contract law, 
it would limit the powers of the English courts to (sanction) schemes that affect the 
rights of creditors under contracts that are governed by English law, which is an 
approach that the English courts do not follow in respect of companies incorporated 
under English law and with COMI in the UK.
24
 Starting from this “contractual” 
approach it is, for example, difficult to understand how the English courts could 
amend the terms of bonds that are governed by New York law as was the case in 
the scheme in relation to Magyar Telecom.
25
 
 
61 Secondly, in our view this “contractual” approach disregards the fact that 
dissenting creditors are bound to the scheme (and thus the amended contract) 
pursuant to the judgment of the court sanctioning the scheme (notwithstanding their 
objections or the fact that they did not vote). Without recognition of that judgment 
it appears difficult, if not impossible, to argue that the effects of the scheme (on the 
contract) can take effect against such dissenting creditors. In our view, the 
recognition of the court order sanctioning the scheme is pivotal. This places it much 
more in the domain of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
                                                 
22 Above note 20. 
23 Hannigan, above note 9, at paragraphs 26-101. 
24 See, for example, the scheme of arrangement in respect of the English insurance company Equitable 
Life, which also purported to amend rights of policy holders under insurance policies governed by 
German law. The German Bundesgerichtshof denied recognition to this scheme, not because the claims 
of the German policy holders were governed by German law and therefore could not be amended 
pursuant to an English law scheme of arrangement, but because the rules of jurisdiction in relation to 
insurance contracts under the Brussels I Regulation had not been observed (see BGH 15 February 2012 
(IV ZR 194/09)). 
25 [2013] EWHC 3800 (Ch). 
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Brussels I Regulation 
 
62 In our view a scheme of arrangement may be recognised and given effect under 
the Brussels I Regulation. The order of the English court confirming a scheme of 
arrangement, in our view is a judgment within the terms of Article 32 of the 
Brussels I Regulation that should be recognised in accordance with Articles 33 et 
seq. of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
63 A scheme of arrangement falls within the material scope of application of the 
Brussels I Regulation. It clearly concerns a civil or commercial matter within the 
meaning of Article 1(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. We have no doubt that a 
scheme of arrangement fits into that category. There are, however, some potential 
obstacles in respect of the applicability of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
64 Article 1(2)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation excludes from its scope:  
 
“bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal 
persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings.” 
 
65 The question that arises is whether a judgment sanctioning a scheme in 
accordance with Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006 is excluded from the scope of 
application of the Brussels Regulation pursuant to this provision. In our view this is 
not the case. Further, the exclusion of the issues referred to in Article 1(2)(b) of the 
Brussels I Regulation must be considered in relation to the scope of application of 
the European Insolvency Regulation.
 
The two regulations should dovetail almost 
completely. This was reaffirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
its decision of 4 September 2014, where the Court observed: 
 
“In this respect, it should be noted that, relying inter alia on the preparatory documents 
relating to the Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 1978 L 304, p. 36), which was replaced by 
Regulation No 44/2001, the Court has held that that regulation and Regulation No 
1346/2000 must be interpreted in such a way as to avoid any overlap between the rules of 
law that those texts lay down and any legal vacuum. Accordingly, actions excluded, under 
Article 1(2)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001, from the application of that regulation in so far 
as they come under ‘bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent 
companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous 
proceedings’ fall within the scope of Regulation No 1346/2000. Following the same 
reasoning, actions which fall outside the scope of Article 3(1) of Regulation No 
1346/2000 fall within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001 (judgment in F-Tex, C-213/10, 
EU:C:2012:215, paragraphs 21, 29 and 48).”26 
                                                 
26 CJEU 4 September 2014, case C-157/13 (Nickel & Goeldner Spedition v Kintra). See also P. Jenard, 
“Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters” Official Journal J 5 March 1979, nr C 59, at 11 and 12; P. Schlosser, “Report on the 
Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters and the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice” Official 
Journal 5 March 1979, nr C 59, at paragraph 53. 
256  Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 
 
66 The issues that fall within the scope of application of the European Insolvency 
Regulation are governed by the specific rules (on jurisdiction, applicable law and 
recognition) of the European Insolvency Regulation and are excluded from the 
scope of application of the Brussels Regulation. Similarly, issues that fall outside 
the scope of application of the European Insolvency Regulation are included in the 
scope of the Brussels I Regulation (provided, of course, that they are civil or 
commercial matters that are not excluded from the scope of application of the 
Brussels I Regulation for some other reason, for example because they concern 
arbitration, cf. Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels I Regulation). 
 
67 Article 1(2)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation therefore entails that a court 
approved composition that is concluded within the framework of an insolvency 
proceeding is excluded from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation.
27
 It does not 
lead to a scheme of arrangement, which is adopted outside the framework of – and 
in fact to prevent – insolvency proceedings, being excluded from the scope of 
application of the Brussels I Regulation.
28
 
 
68 A further possible obstacle to the applicability of the Brussels I Regulation that 
has been identified is that the Brussels I Regulation would only apply to 
contentious or adversary proceedings. It has been argued that the rules (on 
jurisdiction) of the Brussels I Regulation only apply to actions or claims in which 
the court settles a dispute between parties (hence the references in the regulation to 
“plaintiff”, “defendant”, “shall be sued”, etc.). Given the fact that the interventions 
of the English court in relation to a scheme are not of that nature – the court does 
not settle a dispute between parties, but only intervenes to ensure that the “cram 
down” of the scheme on the minority of dissenting or not voting creditors is not 
unreasonable –, schemes could not be characterized as proceedings and the order 
sanctioning a scheme could not be characterized as a judgment for purposes of the 
Brussels I Regulation.
29
 
 
69 We do not share that view. The court order sanctioning a scheme of 
arrangement, in our view, constitutes a judgment within the terms of Article 32 of 
the Brussels I Regulation.
30
 Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation has a very wide 
                                                 
27 See Article 25(1), European Insolvency Regulation. 
28 See also the observations of Briggs J. in the matter of Rodenstock [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch), at 
paragraph 51: “In my judgment, proceedings seeking the court’s sanction of a scheme in relation to a 
solvent company do fall within the scope of the Judgments Regulation. They are plainly ‘civil and 
commercial matters’ within Article 1 and it was no part of the purpose of the bankruptcy exclusion in 
Article 1.2(b), construed having regard for example to the Schlosser Report, to exclude any civil or 
commercial matter which was not to fall within the scope of the European Insolvency Regulation or, 
more generally, which was not connected with bankruptcy or insolvency.” 
29 Above note 20, at 328. 
30 A German court in the matter of Equitable Life (OLG Celle, 8 September 2009) took the view that a 
court order sanctioning a scheme of arrangement is not a judgment within the terms of Article 32 of the 
Brussels I Regulation. This decision was appealed to the German Bundesgerichtshof, which rendered 
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notion of “judgment”. The Brussels I Regulation applies to decisions taken by a 
court, irrespective of the particular manner in which the proceedings started. The 
Brussels I Regulation does not require any particular procedural form for a 
judgment. It applies to contentious proceedings that commence with a summons, 
but it equally applies to cases of voluntary jurisdiction where the proceedings start 
with a petition to the court (in Dutch: “verzoekschrift”) and there are no 
“defendants”.31 In the assessment of whether a court order sanctioning a scheme is 
a judgment within the terms of Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation, it is 
important to also keep in mind that the role of the court that sanctions a scheme of 
arrangement is not merely a formal or “rubber stamping” one given that all 
interested parties, i.e. the creditors that will be affected by the proposed scheme, 
are invited before the court to express their views and raise possible objections to 
the scheme. A judge hearing an application to sanction a scheme will determine 
whether he has jurisdiction to sanction the scheme and whether he is satisfied that it 
is appropriate to exercise his discretion to sanction the scheme, even if there has 
                                                                                                                 
its decision on 15 February 2012 (IV ZR 194/09). In its decision the German Bundesgerichtshof 
acknowledged that there are good reasons to argue that the court order sanctioning a scheme of 
arrangement is a judgment within the terms of Article 32, Brussels I Regulation, in particular in view of 
the contentious elements of the proceedings under Part 26, Companies Act 2006, but it did not decide 
the question (nor did it refer questions for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European 
Union), because, according to the Bundesgerichtshof, recognition of the order was, in that case, 
prevented by Article 35(1), Brussels I Regulation, given that, briefly stated, the scheme in that case 
sought to vary or modify claims under insurance policies (governed by German law and) concerning 
German policy holders in respect of which the jurisdiction of the English courts conflicted with Articles 
8 and 12, Brussels I Regulation. 
31 See P. Jenard, “Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters” Official Journal of 5 March 1979, C 59, at 9. “The Convention also applies 
irrespective of whether the proceedings are contentious or non-contentious.” See also P. Schlosser, 
“Report on the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of 
Justice” Official Journal 5 March 1979, nr C 59, at paragraph 23: “The scope of the 1968 Convention 
is limited to legal proceedings and judgments which relate to civil and commercial matters. All such 
proceedings not expressly excluded fall within its scope.” Non-contentious proceedings are not 
expressly excluded. That non-contentious proceedings (cases of voluntary jurisdiction that start with a 
petition to the court) are included in the scope of the Brussels I Regulation is also the position of the 
Court of Appeal of Amsterdam in respect of petitions for the sanctioning of collective settlements under 
the Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Claims (Wet collectieve afwikkeling 
massaschade), see e.g. Hof Amsterdam 12 November 2010, LJN: BO3908 (Converium). The Act 
provides for collective redress in mass damages on the basis of a settlement agreement concluded 
between one or more foundations or associations representing a group (class) of affected persons to 
whom damage was allegedly caused and one or more allegedly liable parties. Once a settlement 
agreement is concluded by the parties, they may then jointly request the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to 
declare this collective settlement binding. If the court grants the request, the agreement binds all 
persons covered by its terms and represented by the representative foundation(s) or association(s), 
except for those persons who notified that they do not wish to be bound by the agreement (“opt out”), 
within a period to be determined by the Court of at least three months following its judgment that gives 
binding effect to the collective settlement. 
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been no opposition to the scheme at the hearing.
32
 In considering whether to 
sanction a scheme the court will take into account, amongst other things: 
 
(a) whether all relevant formalities have been complied with; 
(b) whether the meetings of creditors have been properly held and the majority acted bona 
fide in supporting the scheme; and 
(c) whether the scheme is such that an intelligent and honest person, who is a member of the 
class concerned and acting alone in respect of his interests as such a member, might 
reasonably approve it. 
 
70 The judgment sanctioning the scheme also has the effect of a conclusive 
judgment. In particular, in respect of outvoted dissenting creditors, the judgment 
has constitutive effect in the sense that, as a result of the court sanctioning the 
scheme, they are also bound by the scheme notwithstanding that they voted against 
the adoption of the scheme.
33
 If a court order sanctioning a scheme of arrangement 
is within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation and constitutes a judgment within 
the terms of Article 32 of the Brussels I Regulation (which, in our view, is the 
case), it shall be recognised in the other EU Member States, unless one of the 
grounds for non-recognition as exhaustively listed in Articles 34 and 35(1) of the 
Brussels I Regulation applies. 
 
71 In view of our critical observations regarding the situations in which English 
courts are willing to accept jurisdiction to sanction schemes in relation to non-UK 
companies, it is important to note that, pursuant to Article 35(3) of the Brussels I 
Regulation, a court in another Member State may not review the jurisdiction of the 
English courts in sanctioning a scheme of arrangement. This is only different if 
such jurisdiction conflicts with sections 3, 4 or 6 of Chapter II or in a case provided 
for in Article 72 of the Brussels I Regulation (see Article 35(1) of the Brussels I 
Regulation).
34
 This means that recognition of the court order sanctioning the 
scheme in principle does not require that the English courts have assumed 
jurisdiction in accordance with the rules of the Brussels I Regulation. Even if 
schemes are “caught by” the Brussels I Regulation, this does not prevent the 
English courts from applying their own domestic rules on jurisdiction or, at least, 
doing so does not necessarily block the recognition of the scheme in other EU 
Member States. 
 
                                                 
32 As is shown, for example, by the judgment in Rodenstock [2011] EWHC 1104 (Ch). 
33 A similar argument has been made in respect of the judgment by the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam 
confirming settlements pursuant to the Dutch Act on the Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Claims 
(Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade), cf. H. van Lith, “The Dutch Collective Settlements Act and 
Private International Law” (2011) 2 IPR Thema Reeks (2011, Maklu Publishers, Apeldoorn), at 
paragraph 5.2. 
34 This means, for example, that if a scheme is aimed at the dissolution of a company as referred to in 
Article 22(2), Brussels I Regulation, such scheme shall not be recognised in other Member States if the 
company does not have its seat in England. 
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72 A court order sanctioning a scheme may also be denied recognition if such 
recognition would be “manifestly contrary to public policy” in the Member State in 
which recognition is sought (Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation). This will 
not easily be the case. The public policy exception: 
 
(a) can only prevent recognition in exceptional circumstances; 
(b) is not easily accepted; and 
(c) may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction. 
 
73 Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation can, in our view, generally not prevent 
recognition of English schemes in the other Member States. If fundamental 
principles of fair trial are observed in the proceedings leading to the sanctioning of 
the scheme by the English court, it will be difficult to argue that recognition of the 
scheme is manifestly contrary to the public policy of another Member States. For 
example, in the Netherlands, even though Dutch law – at present35 – does not have 
an equivalent to an English law scheme of arrangement, Dutch law is not unfamiliar 
with situations where the binding force of a majority decision is imposed (if 
sanctioned by the court) on dissenting creditors and creditors that did not vote
36
 and 
thus, in our view, recognition of the binding effect of a scheme that is supported by 
the requisite majority of creditors and sanctioned by the court is not incompatible 
with the core values of Dutch law. 
 
Conclusion 
 
74 English courts (rightfully) take into consideration, when requested to sanction a 
scheme of arrangement, whether the decision and thus the implications of the 
scheme will be recognised in other Member States. As demonstrated above, we 
believe that based under the EU rules, the sanction of a scheme by an English court 
should be recognised in other Member States. This recognition should not be based 
on the European Insolvency Regulation or the Rome I Regulation, but on the 
Brussels I Regulation, on the basis that the court order sanctioning a scheme must 
be considered a judgment within the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
75 Should the Brussels I Regulation not be applicable, recognition of a scheme of 
arrangement may be based on rules of domestic private international law. In this 
respect, from a Dutch perspective we note that in our view it is likely that a Dutch 
court will nevertheless recognise the English court order sanctioning a scheme – 
                                                 
35 As mentioned in the introduction, a pre-draft for a bill has been released, in which a Dutch scheme of 
arrangement is proposed. 
36 Both formal Dutch insolvency proceedings, surseance van betaling and faillissement allow for a 
composition plan to be presented to and voted on by creditors, whereby the majority approval will bind 
all creditors. Also, the aforementioned pre-draft bill for the introduction of a Dutch scheme of 
arrangement has received broad support amongst scholars and practitioners. 
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thus giving effect to the scheme in the Netherlands – under rules of Dutch domestic 
private international law.
37
 
 
 
Concluding Observations 
 
76 As we have discussed in this contribution, English courts have recently been 
requested frequently to sanction schemes of arrangement to restructure the debts of 
non-UK companies on the basis of Chapter 26 of the Companies Act 2006. In its 
decisions, the court considers both the grounds to accept jurisdiction and the 
question whether the court order sanctioning the scheme will be recognized in other 
Member States. 
 
77 We find that in the development of case law, the English courts have taken a 
chameleonesque approach when establishing the required sufficient connection 
with the English jurisdiction, in order to sanction schemes. It seems that even in 
situations where there seems to be no relevant connection with the United Kingdom 
at the outset, the courts will go a long way in finding (aided by counsel) a 
connection with the United Kingdom that suffices to accept jurisdiction. In doing 
so, the courts have been pushing the envelope. 
 
78 We have concluded that an English court order sanctioning a scheme of 
arrangement should be recognised in other Member States, based on the fact that 
the court order falls within the scope of the Brussels I Regulation. That Regulation 
does not allow the court in which recognition is sought, to (really) revisit the 
question whether the English court was right in accepting jurisdiction. 
Consequently, once the English court has accepted jurisdiction and sanctioned the 
scheme, there is no real possibility to avoid the consequences of the scheme in 
other Member States by challenging recognition of the court order. 
 
79 It seems that one of the reasons, if not the sole reason, why non UK-companies 
have sought assistance from the English law and English courts by means of a 
                                                 
37 The relevant conditions are (i) that the foreign court assumed jurisdiction on internationally 
acceptable grounds, (ii) the proceedings were held in accordance with principles of fair trial and (iii) 
such recognition is not in conflict with Dutch public policy. We believe that these conditions are met. 
In comparison, according to the Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, the Dutch courts, inter alia, have 
jurisdiction in matters that commence by the filing of a petition if: (a) either one or more of the 
applicants or one of the interested parties mentioned in the petition is domiciled or habitually resident 
in the Netherlands; or (b) the matter is otherwise sufficiently connected to the legal sphere of the 
Netherlands. This view is also supported by the fact that the Dutch courts in practice also rather 
generously accept jurisdiction in respect of the sanctioning of settlements under the Act on the 
Collective Settlement of Mass Damage Claims (Wet collectieve afwikkeling massaschade), in one case 
(Converium) accepting jurisdiction although only some 200 of 1,200 interested parties were domiciled 
in the Netherlands. See also H. Verhagen and J. Kuipers, “De erkenning van een Engelse scheme of 
arrangement door de Nederlandse rechter”, in N. Faber et al. (eds), Overeenkomsten en Insolventie 
(2012, Kluwer, Deventer), at 352 et seq. 
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scheme of arrangement is that the relevant home jurisdiction did not provide for 
adequate similar restructuring tools. In the legal (restructuring) practice, the rather 
cooperative approach that the English courts have taken in accepting jurisdiction 
has therefore been welcomed and that approach has made several successful 
restructurings possible for companies that otherwise would have had to apply for 
the opening of insolvency proceedings. 
 
80 As we have seen, several European countries have now introduced similar 
hybrid restructuring tools or are in the process of doing so. The European 
Commission in its Recommendation has also recommended that all Member States 
introduce a hybrid restructuring tool outside of formal insolvency proceedings. 
Thus, in the future there may be less need for non-UK companies to seek the 
assistance of the English courts and consequently, the English courts may not need 
to stretch their jurisdiction as far as they have done thus far. 
 
81 After all, even the English courts themselves are conscious of the fact that they 
may have been pushing the envelope in the recent schemes that were sanctioned. As 
Hildyard J put this rather fittingly in his judgment in Re Apcoa Parking [2014] 
EWHC 3849 (Ch), at paragraph 206: 
 
“I have been very conscious that these Schemes do test the boundaries of a jurisdiction 
which is by its nature potentially exorbitant. It is important, both in terms of propriety and 
to safeguard a salutary and useful jurisdiction to take care in its application.” 
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